Is Palimony In New Jersey Over As We Knew It?

Very often, we write about cases for which we have had no involvement. Today, we get to toot our own horn a little and write about one of our cases that made new law. The case is Maeker v. Ross, a reported (precedential) opinion decided on February 4, 2013, by the Appellate Division. This case may very well represent the death knell of palimony cases as we knew them.

As we discussed in the past, in 2010, the Legislature passed an amendment to the statute of frauds, which required palimony agreements to be in writing and further stated that no action for palimony shall be brought unless the agreement was in writing. The Appellate Division quite definitively interpreted the legislative intent of the amendment to preclude any palimony suits brought after the amendment unless there was a written agreement that complied with the amendment, even if the relationship and alleged promise for support predated the amendment. The Appellate Division stated:

... The motion judge found that plaintiff's complaint was not barred by the 2010 amendment to the Statute of Frauds, N.J.S.A. 25:1-5(h) (Amendment), requiring a writing memorializing palimony agreements and independent advice of counsel for each party in advance of executing any such agreement. We reverse and hold that the Amendment is enforcement legislation that addresses under what circumstances a claimed breach of a palimony agreement may be enforced irrespective of when the purported agreement was entered.

In this case, the parties were in a more than 10 year relationship where they resided together and defendant provided for support and other financial benefits for plaintiff. There was, however, no joint property, joint accounts and nothing other than insignificant joint financial ties. The trial judge allowed the claim for palimony to continue based upon an implied promise of support (palimony).

The Appellate Division made clear that this claim had to be filed before the effective date of the amendment to the statute of frauds. Otherwise, it was barred. However, in this case, the claim did not accrue until after the statute was enacted. The Appellate Division noted:

Here, the motion judge agreed with plaintiff's contention that her cause of action arose before the effective date of the Amendment, premised upon the judge's apparent view that the cause of action for palimony accrues at the time the agreement is entered, which in this case was prior to the effective date of the Amendment. The...