Late last year we happily blogged about Utts v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., ___ F. Supp.3d ___, 2016 WL 7429449 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2016), chiefly because it held that design defect claims against a branded prescription drug (Eliquis) were preempted under the impossibility preemption reasoning in PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604 (2011), and Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S.Ct. 2466 (2013). However, as we noted in that post, dismissal of the non-design aspects of complaint was with "leave to amend." See also Utts, 2016 WL 7429449, at *1.
Of course, plaintiffs amended.
Now, they probably wish they hadn't.
In a second opinion, issued earlier this month, the Utts litigation was dismissed a second time, this time with prejudice. Utts v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., ___ F. Supp.3d ___, 2017 WL 1906875 (S.D.N.Y. May 8, 2017) ("Utts II"). Preemption was once again front and center, but this time an excellent preemption result was accompanied by a variety of equally pleasing common-law - California law - rulings.
First, preemption. Design defect claims had already been preempted under Mensing/Bartlett, as plaintiffs were reminded whenever they crossed the line into design-type claims. Id. at *1, 9, 10 n.10, 13 n.15, 16, 19. But the major preemption issue this time around involved warnings - and whether any of the information that plaintiffs claimed required some kind of "better" warnings involved "newly acquired information" of the sort that a defendant could unilaterally add given the scope of the FDA's "changes being effected" exception to preemption recognized in Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009). See 21 C.F.R. §314.3(b) (known as the "CBE" regulation for drugs - note, there are similar CBE regulations for devices and biologics; we've discussed the device regulation here).
For a more detailed discussion of the "newly acquired information" aspect of preemption, see our post here about In re Celexa & Lexapro Marketing & Sales Practices Litigation, 779 F.3d 34 (1st Cir. 2015), which was the first appellate decision finding preemption where plaintiffs failed to come forward with any "new" information to support their warning claims. Utts II explained that, in the preemption context, "if the plaintiff can point to the existence of 'newly acquired information' to support a labeling change under the CBE regulation, the burden then shifts to the manufacturer to show by 'clear evidence' that the FDA would not have approved the labeling change made on the basis of this newly acquired information." 2017 WL 1906875, at *9.
Plaintiffs threw a lot of mud at the drug and its manufacturer, but nothing they heaved against the wall stuck - everything plaintiffs cited all old information that did not go beyond what the FDA had before it when it approved the drug in the first place.
Why is that?
Basically, Eliquis is a next-generation anticoagulant, very effective at what it does, and not requiring the kind of dietary restrictions and constant blood testing that older blood thinners such as warfarin - originally sold as rat poison - do. Utts II, 2017 WL 1906875, at *2 & n.4. Unfortunately, the plaintiffs' bar has decided that anybody needing anticoagulation therapy should be should only have such older drugs available, and has launched an ongoing litigation assault at practically every next generation anticoagulant (others include Xarelto and Pradaxa) - because of risks of serious and sometimes fatal bleeding inherent in what these drugs are supposed to do.
The FDA was well aware of the risks that Eliquis, like any other anticoagulant, could cause uncontrollable bleeding when it approved it. Indeed, the "label warns about the risk of serious bleeding no less than five times." Id. at *3. It "specifically warns about the risk of bleeding" during concomitant therapy "in conjunction with antiplatelet agents, such as aspirin." Id. at *4. The labeling also "twice warns about the fact that there is no specific antidote" should serious bleeding...